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Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. This paper includes a review of the relevant 
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proposed 2005 amendments to the Act and how they affect the confidentiality of library 
records. Finally, it attempts to formulate an argument for establishing a constitutional 
right to read and use libraries anonymously. 
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I. Introduction 
Public libraries hold an important place in any democracy as they provide equal 
access to information for all citizens. It is therefore of the utmost importance that our 
legal system provide protection for privacy in libraries. Neither the federal government 
nor the United States Supreme Court has explicitly guaranteed the protection of 
confidentiality of library records. Instead, the federal government has a history of 
impinging on the private and anonymous use of libraries, with the most recent example 
being the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act). However, courts 
have long recognized that several amendments to the U.S. Constitution provide the bases 
for a right to confidentiality in personal matters. This paper will analyze the possibility of 
establishing a constitutional right to read and use libraries anonymously. Section II of the 
paper will discuss the current federal and state laws concerning library records. Next, 
Section III examines the different privacy interests recognized by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Section IV analyzes the provisions of the PATRIOT Act that are relevant to 
library records, while Section V addresses recently proposed amendments to the Act. 
Finally, Section VI attempts to predict how the Court would handle a constitutional 
challenge to a government action that impinges upon the confidentiality of library patron 
records. 
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II. Federal and State Laws Concerning Library Records 
Despite the esteemed place libraries hold in American society, there has never 
been a federal law protecting library records. However, the U.S. Congress has considered 
the matter of whether the confidentiality of library records should be afforded special 
protection (Torrans 31). In 1988, Congress passed the Video Privacy Protection Act in 
response to a newspaper publishing a list of videotapes that Judge Robert Bork and his 
family had rented at a local video store as part of its coverage of his nomination 
proceedings to the U.S. Supreme Court (Madrinan 821). The bill, as originally written, 
prohibited the disclosure of library borrower records, as well as video rental records, 
“except to the person, to another with the person’s consent, or under court order” (134 
Cong. Rec. S5399 (daily ed. May 10, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy)). The “court order” 
portion of the bill essentially provided that law enforcement personnel would need to 
demonstrate probable cause to a judge before a court would issue an order authorizing a 
video store or library to turn over customer or patron records (Madrinan 821). This is 
similar to the Fourth Amendment requirement of a showing of probable cause before a 
search warrant may be issued in a criminal investigation. Probable cause is defined as 
“more than a bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction” 
(“Probable Cause”). 
Regrettably, by the time the bill emerged from committee, the library portion of 
the bill had been amended out (Madrinan 821). The Senate Committee of the Judiciary’s 
report does not reveal the exact reasons for the change, but it does note that the bill 
originally “included…a protection for library borrower records, recognizing that there is 
a close tie between what one views and what one reads…[h]owever, the committee was 
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unable to resolve questions regarding the application of such a provision for law 
enforcement” (S. Rep. No. 100-599, at 8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342-1 
to –8). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was opposed to protecting library 
records in the bill and tried to introduce a national security letter exemption. The clash 
between the FBI and proponents of library privacy protection resulted in simply deleting 
the library portion from the bill altogether (Foerstel 125-133).  
Although Congress chose not to protect library records, forty-eight states and the 
District of Columbia have passed statutes protecting the confidentiality of records of what 
library users read and do in libraries (Klinefelter 224). Some statutes, such as Indiana’s, 
merely declare that library records are confidential (Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 5-14-3-4 
(2005)). Other states, such as North Carolina, declare that library records are confidential 
and specify the circumstances under which records may be disclosed (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
125-19 (2005)). The North Carolina law provides that library records may be disclosed 
“(1) When necessary for the reasonable operation of the library; (2) Upon written consent 
of the user; or (3) Pursuant to subpoena, court order, or where otherwise required by law” 
(N.C. Gen. Stat. § 125-19(b) (2005)). The remaining two states, Hawaii and Kentucky, do 
not have statutes protecting library records, but do have attorney generals’ opinions 
declaring library records confidential (90 Op. Attorney Gen. 30 (Hi. 1990)); 81 Op. 
Attorney Gen. 159 (Ky. 2002)). 
The passage of state laws protecting the confidentiality of library records and 
library use was largely the result of work by librarians and library associations acting in 
response to a FBI surveillance effort called the “Library Awareness Program” 
(Klinefelter 224). The Cold War-era program was established to track Soviet use of 
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technology information available in American public libraries The program included the 
recruitment of library staff as FBI agents, as well as requests for records of library use 
(Foerstel).  
III. Constitutional Protection of Privacy Interests 
Although Congress has declined to pass a law expressly protecting the 
confidentiality of library records, support for such protection can be found in the 
penumbra surrounding the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
(Torrans 36). For the purposes of this paper, I will focus my analysis on cases decided 
using the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments that support constitutional 
protection for the confidentiality of library records. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the right to anonymity in a variety 
of First Amendment contexts, dating back to Talley v. California in 1960 (362 U.S. 60 
(1960)). In that case, the petitioner was arrested and fined for distributing unsigned 
handbills urging a boycott against merchants who were noncompliant with equal 
employment opportunity requirements. The Court invalidated a Los Angeles city 
ordinance that required handbills to include the names and addresses of persons who 
prepared, distributed, or sponsored them, stating that such a law “would tend to restrict 
freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression” (Talley 64). In 
doing so, the Court recognized that the First Amendment protection of free speech also 
extended to publishing and distributing information. 
The Court upheld the Talley decision thirty-five years later, in McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Committee, holding that an Ohio statute requiring pamphlets to be signed was 
unconstitutional (514 U.S. 334 (1995)). The Court held that choosing to publish reading 
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materials anonymously was itself expression that should be protected by the First 
Amendment. As Justice Stevens contended: “[A]n author’s decision to remain 
anonymous...is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment” 
(McIntyre 342). Since the Court found that that law requiring author identification was “a 
direct regulation of the content of speech,” it applied an “exacting scrutiny test” and 
invalidated the statute because it was not “narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state 
interest” (McIntyre 345). The Court has expanded upon this right to anonymity in two 
recent cases, recognizing the right to circulate petitions anonymously in Buckley v. 
American Constitutional Law Foundation (525 U.S. 182 (1999)) and to canvass door-to-
door anonymously in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of 
Stratton (536 U.S. 150 (2002)). The Court has not explicitly adopted a standard of review 
to use in anonymity cases, but weighed the value of anonymous speech against the 
interests of the government in each of these cases.  
Another U.S. Supreme Court case providing support for a First Amendment right 
to read anonymously is NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson (357 U.S. 449 (1958)). In 
NAACP, the State of Alabama sought to compel disclosure of rank-and-file membership 
lists of the NAACP (451). This opinion marked the Court’s first announcement of the 
individual right of associational freedom, holding that the members of the NAACP had a 
right to privacy in their association with the organization (NAACP at 462-463). In 
reaching its decision, the Court considered that previous disclosures of the identities of 
NAACP members had exposed those individuals to economic reprisal, loss of 
employment, and threats of physical violence that would likely deter people from joining 
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and associating with the NAACP to advocate social and political views they had a First 
Amendment right to espouse (NAACP 462).  
The Court applied a strict scrutiny standard of review to conclude that the 
government’s action was unconstitutional because it may have the effect of curtailing the 
fundamental freedom to associate, (NAACP 460-461). In constitutional law, strict 
scrutiny is the standard of review applied in cases involving a fundamental right such as 
privacy in due-process analysis (“Strict Scrutiny”). Under strict scrutiny, the government 
must establish that it has a compelling interest that outweighs the individual’s 
constitutional right to be free of the law (“Strict Scrutiny”). In NAACP, the Court found 
that the state’s stated interest of determining whether the NAACP was operating in 
Alabama without complying with the state statutory registration requirement for foreign 
corporations was not sufficient to outweigh the members’ First Amendment protection 
from disclosure. Forcing the disclosure of the list without a state showing that there were 
no less restrictive means of achieving the state’s purpose would violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights of the members of the NAACP (NAACP 466).  
Julie Cohen argues that if interpersonal association and group affiliation are 
expressive behavior protected by the First Amendment, then the right to read 
anonymously should be, as well (1014). If the Court recognizes the dangers of being 
labeled by one’s choice of associates, it should also acknowledge the dangers of being 
labeled by one’s choice of reading material. To put it succinctly: “Reading is intellectual 
association, pure and simple” (Cohen 1014). Just as the rank-and-file members in 
NAACP feared the consequences of their membership being disclosed, library patrons 
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fear being subject to investigation by the government or ostracizing from their 
community as a result of being associated with certain reading materials.  
The most direct support for a right to read or receive reading material 
anonymously comes from the U.S. Supreme Court cases Lamont v. Postmaster General 
(381 U.S. 301 (1965)) and Stanley v. Georgia (394 U.S. 557 (1969)). In Lamont, the 
Court invalidated a postal regulation that authorized the interception of mail classified as 
communist propaganda and required recipients to specially notify the postal service of 
their desire to receive the material. The Court focused its analysis on the government 
surveillance of the materials, rather than a more general right of anonymity; however, the 
Court's reasoning gives support to the notion of a right to read anonymously. Writing for 
the majority, Justice Clark explained how the disclosure of an individual’s reading 
preferences would result in a “chilling effect,” stating that the regulation was “almost 
certain to have a deterrent effect” on individuals’ ability to receive reading materials of 
their choice (Lamont 307). He concluded that the postal regulation was “at war with the 
‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate and discussion that are contemplated by the 
First Amendment” (Lamont 307). 
In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court held that a state could not criminalize the private 
possession of “obscene” materials, even though it may choose to regulate commercial 
distribution of such materials. The Court’s opinion contains language that supports a First 
Amendment right to read anonymously, noting that the statute’s intent was “wholly 
inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment” and impinged on “the right to 
be free from state inquiry into the contents of [one’s] library” (Stanley 565-66). Although 
the Court’s opinion specifically mentions a personal library, the logical inference is that 
    9
the nature of materials a person chooses to read should be private and not regulated by 
the state, regardless of whether they were purchased or checked out from a public library. 
The potential for a “chilling effect,” as discussed in Lamont and Stanley, is a 
consideration that often arises when dealing with rights protected by the First 
Amendment. A chilling effect “occurs when individuals seeking to engage in lawful 
activity are deterred from doing so by a governmental regulation not specifically directed 
at that activity” (Horn 749). The U.S. Supreme Court first made reference to a “chilling 
effect” in the 1952 case Wieman v. Updegraff, where the Court invalidated an Oklahoma 
state law requiring teachers to take an oath that they were not then, nor had they been for 
the past five years, part of any organization listed by the government as “subversive” 
(344 U.S. 183 (1952)). Although decided before NAACP, Justice Tom C. Clark, writing 
for the majority, argued that since it was “the fact of association alone” that would 
determine whether a teacher was found to be disloyal, the oath inhibited individual 
freedom and was thus unconstitutional (Wieman 219). Justice Felix Frankfurter, in his 
concurrence described the potential chilling effect: “Such unwarranted inhibition upon 
the free speech of teachers…has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the 
spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice; it makes for caution 
and timidity in their associations by potential teachers” (Wieman 195).  
The First Amendment right to privacy arose again in a public school context in 
Board of Education v. Pico, in which students in junior and senior high school sought to 
establish a constitutional right to receive information through their public school library 
(457 U.S. 853 (1982)). The students brought a constitutional challenge to the school 
board’s decision to remove certain books from the school library. In a complex plurality 
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opinion, the Court used a balancing test to weigh the well-established right of local 
school boards to exercise broad discretion in the management of school affairs against the 
students’ First Amendment right to receive information (Pico). The Court ultimately 
decided that the school board had the right to remove books from the library in this case, 
as long as it did not remove the books in order to restrict the students’ access to 
information of which the board disapproved. Although the plurality notes the interests it 
balanced, it does not articulate the standard of review it applied. Based on the use of strict 
scrutiny in McIntyre and NAACP, the standard for reviewing state action that infringes 
on the right to receive information from public libraries arguably should entail a more 
stringent standard of review, perhaps even strict scrutiny (Hinz 549). 
Although the Court upheld the board’s right to remove the books, the opinion’s 
language still gives strong support to the notion of a right to read and use libraries 
anonymously. The Court articulated the right to receive information as logically 
following from a sender’s explicit textual First Amendment right to send information, 
stating that “the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient’s 
meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom” (Pico 67) 
(emphasis in original). When removed from the context of a public school, where the 
principle of in loco parentis governs, an adult’s right to receive information from a public 
library is arguably much stronger than the students’ rights in Pico.  
The Supreme Court has also considered the chilling effect of government action 
in the context of domestic intelligence gathering. In the 1972 decision Laird v. Tatum 
(408 U.S. 1 (1972)), four individuals and nine associations challenged the 
constitutionality of the United States Army’s surveillance of their lawful civilian political 
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activities. The Army gathered its information through articles published in the news 
media and other publications in general circulation. Other information came from local 
law enforcement and also from Army Intelligence agents who had attended meetings that 
were open to the public (Laird 6). The Court found that the plaintiffs had not suffered any 
direct harm as a result of the Army’s actions and that the chilling effect alleged was not 
sufficient to establish injury-in-fact (Laird 2-3). The Court’s holding turned on whether 
there was an  “objective” or “subjective” chill as a result of the government’s actions, but 
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion also distinguished Laird from earlier chilling effect cases 
by noting that the challenged exercise of governmental power in those cases has been 
“regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature” (Laird 11). By contrast, in Laird, the 
government was not restricting any political activities, but merely observing them. 
 Although the Court in Laird decided the case under the First Amendment, it 
seemed to place great importance on the fact that information that was gathered by the 
Army was from either published material or meetings that were open to the public. The 
Court used a similar analysis in a later case Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 
in which it upheld the monitoring and infiltration of the Socialist Workers Party’s 
convention as constitutional (419 U.S. 1314 (1974)). The Court emphasized that the 
convention was open to the public and the press and found that the use of government 
agents to gather information “would not appear to increase appreciably the ‘chill’ on the 
free debate at the convention” (Social Workers Party 1317). 
Since Laird and Socialist Workers Party both involve intelligence gathering, they 
implicate the Fourth Amendment, as its purpose is to protect citizens from unreasonable 
searches and seizures (U.S. Const. Amend. IV). It provides: 
    12
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, paper, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be 
seized. 
 
Courts have held that the Fourth Amendment requires a showing of “probable 
cause” for any search warrant and that the government specifically describes what they 
expect to recover in the warrant (Martin 292). These requirements are to ensure that the 
government does not use subpoenas or warrants to harass people and that law 
enforcement agents do not invade individuals’ privacy unnecessarily. Using general 
subpoenas, law enforcement officials have generally been able to demand library records 
in criminal investigations, including two famous recent cases: the Unabomber, who wrote 
meticulous academic treatises to accompany his string of bombing over the course of two 
decades, and the “Zodiac Killer,” who had cited the works of an obscure cult poet 
(Lichtblau A11). 
The line of privacy cases beginning with the 1967 case Katz v. United States 
established that the Fourth Amendment protects only those things in which a person has 
“a reasonable expectation of privacy” and likewise, that one does not have a “reasonable” 
expectation of privacy in anything that one exposes to the public (389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
What is private and therefore protected from searches under the Fourth Amendment 
varies by situation, since it involves determining in each instance whether one’s 
expectation of privacy is “reasonable.” This requires the court to use a balancing test 
weighing the potential gain to the community against the harm of intruding on one’s 
privacy (Martin 293). For example, in U.S. v. White, the Court held that an individual’s 
conversation with a third party was not protected by the Fourth Amendment, since he 
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voluntarily exposed his words to the public (401 U.S. 745 (1971)). Therefore, a 
cooperating witness was allowed to tape a conversation without obtaining a subpoena or 
warrant beforehand (White).  
As domestic intelligence gathering cases like Laird and Socialist Workers Party 
illustrate, the privacy issues involved in determining the confidentiality of library records 
implicate both the First and Fourth Amendments. In Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of 
Thornton, the Colorado Supreme Court discussed both amendments in acknowledging a 
right to privacy in reading records (44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002)). The case involved law 
enforcement officials serving a Colorado bookseller with a search warrant seeking to 
discover which customers had purchased two books detailing how to set up secret 
laboratories for the production of illegal drugs (Tattered Cover). The court held that a 
search warrant seeking information about a customer’s bookstore purchases was invalid 
under the Colorado State Constitution, which provides broader protection for First 
Amendment rights than the U.S. Constitution (Tattered Cover). The court explicitly held 
that both the U.S. Constitution and the Colorado Constitution “protect an individual’s 
fundamental right to purchase books anonymously, free from governmental interference” 
(Tattered Cover 1047).  
The court in Tattered Cover specifically cited the U.S. Supreme Court case 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily as a case where the Court may have extended heightened 
protection of expressive materials in requiring “scrupulous exactitude” in compliance 
with particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment (436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978)). 
However, the court in Tattered Cover found that even this heightened protection of 
expressive materials was insufficient for at least Colorado state constitutional purposes 
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and instead applied strict scrutiny in examining the warrant (Tattered Cover 1055-58). In 
using this standard of review, the court held that the warrant was invalid, as the stated 
governmental interest was not so compelling as to outweigh the importance of reader 
privacy for the unrestrained exercise of First Amendment rights (Tattered Cover). 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia also applied strict scrutiny as 
the standard of review in a case involving a demand for book purchase records in In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords, Inc. (26 Med. L. Rptr. 1599 
(D.D.C. 1998)). Independent Prosecutor Kenneth Starr subpoenaed Monica Lewinsky’s 
book purchase records for the period 1995 to 1998, and both Lewinsky and the 
bookstores involved moved to quash the subpoena (Kramerbooks 1599). Although the 
case was ultimately settled out of court, the court announced that the request would have 
to overcome strict scrutiny review because it would chill the exercise of First 
Amendment freedoms (Kramerbooks). The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet made such a 
clear pronouncement about the right to read anonymously, but Tattered Cover and 
Kramerbooks both support the proposition that book purchase records should be given 
strong protection under the First Amendment. It follows logically that such protection 
should also be extended to library patron records. 
Michael J. O’Donnell argues that reading records may also be protected under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to information privacy, first articulated by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe (429 U.S. 589 (1977)) and affirmed in Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services (433 U.S. 425 (1977)). In Whalen, the Court upheld a 
New York state statute that required that the state department of health retain all 
prescription records for dangerous drugs with legitimate purposes, such as opium, 
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cocaine, and amphetamines (592-93). In so holding, the Court stated that the “privacy” 
cases the Court had considered “involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is 
the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is 
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions” (Whalen 599-600). The 
former involves a “genuine concern that the information will become publicly known and 
that it will adversely affect their reputations,” i.e., a chilling effect (Whalen 600) The 
latter interest in decisional privacy implicates the ability to make important decisions 
independently and is exemplified by the Court’s opinion in the abortion cases Roe v. 
Wade (410 U.S. 113 (1973)) and Griswold v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479 (1965)). Justice 
Stevens distinguished the privacy issue in Whalen from the recently decided decisional 
privacy cases, finding that the statute in question did threaten to impair the plaintiffs’ 
“interest in the nondisclosure of private information,” but found that the security 
provisions in place to prevent such disclosures were sufficient (600). 
The issue of information privacy arose again in Nixon v. Administrator of 
General Services, in which the Court allowed the use of a federal statute to authorize 
seizure of President Nixon’s presidential papers, but not his purely private 
communications (433 U.S. 425 (1977)). Although the Court found that the privacy 
interest asserted by Nixon was “weaker than that found wanting in the recent decision of 
Whalen v. Roe” (Nixon 458), it concluded that “when Government intervention is at 
stake, public officials, including the President, are not wholly without constitutionally 
protected rights in matters of personal life unrelated to any acts done by them in their 
personal capacity” (Nixon 457). As it expressly cites Whalen, this passage is viewed by 
many courts and scholars as an affirmation of the constitutional right to information 
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privacy enunciated in Whalen and is the last time the Court has directly addressed the 
issue (O’Donnell 49). 
IV. USA PATRIOT Act and Library Records 
 None of the privacy cases discussed above directly addressed the PATRIOT Act, 
which was passed in 2001 and drastically changed the legal landscape in the area of 
privacy law. Only six weeks after the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York City 
and Washington, D.C., Congress passed the 131-page PATRIOT Act by a vote of 357 to 
66 in the House of Representatives and a vote of 98 to 1 in the Senate (Sandell-Weiss 
10). There were no hearings, and little legislative history exists (Sandell-Weiss 10). The 
act modified various sections of the United States Code, including the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which deals with international terrorism 
and foreign intelligence investigations (Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978)). 
Section 501 of FISA originally allowed the FBI to obtain “business records” from a 
limited group of public or private businesses including vehicle rental companies and 
storage facilities, but the PATRIOT Act amends FISA to expand the category of 
“business records” to include “any tangible thing,” including library circulation records, 
subscription lists, and lists of Web site visitors (PATRIOT Act, Section 215(a)(1)).  
In order to investigate an individual using the PATRIOT Act, a request must be 
made to a member of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which is 
comprised of U.S. Magistrate Judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States 
(PATRIOT Act, Section 215(b)(1)(A)). When this court was first established, its purpose 
was to investigate foreign powers, not U.S. citizens. Section 215 amended FISA to allow 
the FBI to apply to the FISC for an order without showing any suspicion that the target of 
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the investigation is involved in terrorism or proof that the requested items show any 
involvement in terrorist activity. The standard is merely that the records must be “sought 
for” a foreign intelligence or terrorism investigation (PATRIOT Act, Section 215(b)(2)). 
This standard marked a stark contrast from the law prior to the passage of the PATRIOT 
Act, which required law enforcement agents to show “probable cause” of illegal activity 
in a criminal court to obtain a subpoena or search warrant. Section 215 also imposes a 
gag order prohibiting all individuals, including those who receive section 215 requests, 
e.g. librarians, from disclosing the fact that a request has been made “to any other person” 
(PATRIOT Act, Section 215(d)).  
Section 505 is the other portion of the PATRIOT Act that directly affects the 
confidentiality of library records. It amended the existing power to issue National 
Security Letters (NSLs) (PATRIOT Act, Section 505). An NSL is an administrative 
subpoena used by the FBI to obtain several types of records. The use of NSLs marks a 
sharp departure from the typical use of grand jury subpoenas in criminal investigations. 
First, grand juries, by their nature, have a narrower focus than NSLs because they 
investigate past criminal conduct, while NSLs are issued to investigate the possibility of 
unknown future attacks (Gellman A1). Also, there is no gag rule with most grand jury 
subpoenas, and recipients are generally free to discuss the subpoenas publicly. 
Furthermore, there are strict limits in place on sharing grand jury information with 
government agencies, which is very different from the case with NSLs (Gellman A1). 
The judicial review involved in acquiring an NSL is also much less strict. In order to get 
a subpoena, an attorney must demonstrate probable cause to a judge, but Section 505 has 
broadened the authority to sign NSLs to more than five dozen officials, including special 
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agents in charge of field offices, the deputies in New York, Los Angeles, and 
Washington, as well as a few senior headquarters officials (Gellman A1). That standard is 
“so basic, it is hard to come up with a plausible way to fail” (Gellman A1).  
Two years after the passage of the PATRIOT Act, then Attorney General John 
Ashcroft rescinded a 1995 guideline directing that information obtained through an NSL 
about a U.S. citizen or resident “shall be destroyed by the FBI and not further 
disseminated” if it proves to be “not relevant to the purposes for which it was collected” 
(Gellman A1). Ashcroft’s new order provided that “the FBI shall retain” all records it 
collects and “may disseminate” them freely among federal agencies (Gellman A1). The 
order also directed the FBI to develop data mining technology to search for connections 
among all of the people surveilled by the government (Gellman A1). The effect of this 
change is that once someone’s files are obtained using an NSL, her records may be 
scrutinized repeatedly without the FBI ever being required to again establish relevance. 
Alarmingly, according to recently revealed government sources, the FBI now issues more 
than 30,000 NSLs a year, a hundredfold increase over historic norms (Gellman A1).  
It is unclear how often the PATRIOT Act has been used to search library records. 
In the spring of 2003, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in an attempt to discover 
how frequently and in what manner the DOJ had used its new powers granted by the 
PATRIOT Act (265 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2003)). The ACLU sought the disclosure of 
statistical information detailing how often the DOJ had used specific provisions of the 
Act, including “demands for production of tangible things under section 215” (25). The 
DOJ invoked exemptions from FOIA that protect the secrecy of information pertaining to 
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national defense and foreign policy. As a result, the district court ruled in favor of the 
DOJ, denying the ACLU’s motion to compel, since the court was satisfied that the DOJ 
had met its burden in “describing the material withheld and the reasons that it fits within 
one or more of the exemptions” (ACLU 27).  
However, later that year, due in part to pressure from the American Library 
Association (ALA), Ashcroft de-classified information showing that the DOJ had never 
utilized Section 215 to obtain library records (Sandell-Weiss 12) and mockingly 
announced: “Do we at the Justice Department really care what you are reading? No.” 
(Anderson 5). Current Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez continues to maintain that 
officials have yet to expressly use their power under the PATRIOT Act to demand 
records from libraries or bookstores (“Fishing in the Card Catalogs” A20). Yet, according 
to a $300,000 study commissioned by the ALA, law enforcement officials have made at 
least 200 formal and informal inquiries to libraries for information on borrowing records 
and other internal matters since October 2001 (“Fishing in the Card Catalogs” A20). The 
study does not show whether the law enforcement officials used the PATRIOT Act or 
other means to conduct their searches, since Section 215 expressly provides that any 
librarian who reports that she has received a demand for records made under the 
PATRIOT Act faces criminal sanctions for challenging the order or notifying anyone of 
the demand (PATRIOT Act, Section 215(d)).  
The ALA survey’s results provide support for the organization’s claim that the 
PATRIOT Act has had a “chilling effect” on the public’s use of libraries, as there has 
been a demonstrated concern about the government’s powers. Nearly 40 percent of the 
libraries responding reported that patrons had asked about changes in library practices as 
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a result of the PATRIOT Act, and approximately 5 percent of the respondents claimed 
they had altered their professional activities (Lichtblau A11). Such changes made by 
libraries include posting notices informing patrons about the PATRIOT Act, employee 
education programs, and the purging of library records (Phillips 38). An article in the 
library science periodical Alki advocates:  
Libraries should follow a records retention schedule—checkout records, for 
instance, are ephemeral. Follow a destruction schedule carefully, and shred 
unneeded paperwork, especially application forms. Do not keep names if you just 
need statistics. Shred meeting room sign-ups. Though libraries generally keep ILL 
[Interlibrary Loan] statistics for several years, we need not keep borrowers’ names 
attached. (Mclean 10) 
 
The public’s anxiety about the government’s powers has also been noted by the 
politicians currently considering extending certain provisions of the PATRIOT Act. A 
recent newspaper report quoted Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter as 
saying: “You can't open up the paper or turn on the TV without hearing (about) public 
concern about the Patriot Act” (Kellman).  
To date, there have been only a few cases that have contested the constitutionality 
of portions of the PATRIOT Act. In 2003, the ACLU filed suit in the case Muslim 
Community Association of Ann Arbor et. al. v. John Ashcroft, challenging the 
constitutionality of section 215 under both the First and Fourth Amendments (No. 03-
72913 (E.D. Mich. filed July 30, 2003)). The ACLU argued that section 215 violates the 
Fourth Amendment because it implicates an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy and does not require probable cause and because it lacks procedural safeguards 
(Muslim Cmty. Ass’n.). Its First Amendment claim is based on the contention that 
section 215 impinges on free speech activity without providing a compelling state interest 
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or a narrowly tailored program (Muslim Cmty. Ass’n.). The district court has not yet 
decided this case. 
 In the case of Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, the plaintiffs challenged the 
constitutionality of section 805(a)(2)(B) of the PATRIOT Act, specifically the language 
that “prohibit[s] the provision of material support including ‘expert advice or assistance’ 
to designated foreign terrorist organizations” (309 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2004)). 
Although the decision did not address the constitutionality of section 215 of the 
PATRIOT Act, a future plaintiff challenging section 215 may rely on the reasoning of the 
court in Humanitarian Law Project in making her case. The court granted in part the 
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment because the Department of Justice was unable 
to show that the term “expert advice or assistance” is not impermissibly vague 
(Humanitarian Law Project 1200). As a result, the DOJ was enjoined from enforcing the 
subject sections of the laws against the plaintiffs, but the court would not go so far as to 
declare the statute overly broad or to grant a nationwide injunction enforcing it 
(Humanitarian Law Project 1202-04). The court appears to have used a constitutional 
analysis based in the Fourth Amendment and clearly not the First Amendment, as the 
judge specifically states that she found no risk of prosecution for permitted free speech 
activities (Humanitarian Law Project 1203). 
In an article published in the spring of 2004, Anne Klinefelter speculated about a 
hypothetical case where a librarian would “violate nondisclosure as an act of civil 
disobedience,” stating that such a party would “overcome the problem of standing that 
normally prevents challenges to searches that are required to be kept secret” (226). In one 
of two cases currently before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, John Doe 
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v. Gonzalez, the plaintiff did not violate the gag rule, but the ACLU has challenged the 
constitutionality of the application of the gag rule on behalf of an anonymous client (CT 
Civil Action No. 3:05-cv-1256 (2005)). The Washington Post has since discovered that 
“John Doe” is a Connecticut based organization called Library Connection, Inc., which 
possesses sensitive information about library patron borrowing and Internet usage 
(Gellman A1). In September 2005, U.S. District Court Judge Janet C. Hall ruled that the 
FBI gag order violates Library Connection’s First Amendment rights and issued a 
preliminary injunction that would have allowed Library Connection to reveal its identity 
and testify about its experience dealing with the NSL it received (CT Civil Action No. 
3:05-cv-1256 (2005)).  
However, since the government appealed the ruling, the gag order will remain in 
place until the case is conclusively adjudicated. The ACLU filed an emergency appeal 
with the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the Court should lift the gag order on Library 
Connection, so that they may enter into the public debate over the proposed amendments 
to the PATRIOT Act that were soon to be debated by Congress. However, Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg denied the appeal, explaining that the Court of Appeals should be given 
more time to decide the case (546 U.S. _____(2005)). A three-judge panel of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently conducted oral arguments on both Doe 
and a New York case that is the only other case filed challenging the constitutionality of 
an NSL (Neumeister).  
The New York case was brought on behalf of an unidentified internet access firm 
that received an NSL. Government lawyers opposed the entry of the case into the public 
docket of a New York federal judge and have since tried to censor nearly all the contents 
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of the exhibits and briefs (Neumeister). U.S. District Judge Victor Marrero held that that 
law authorizing NSLs violates both the First and Fourth Amendments (334 F. Supp. 2d 
471 (S.D.N.Y., 2004)). The court held that the PATRIOT Act’s NSL provision may 
“violate a subscriber's First Amendment privacy rights, as well as other legal rights, if 
judicial review is not readily available to an ISP that receives an NSL” (Doe 506). The 
court also cited the Act’s lack of judicial review in finding that it violated the Fourth 
Amendment because “it effectively bars or substantially deters any judicial challenge to 
the propriety of an NSL request” (Doe 475). 
V. 2005 Amendments to the USA PATRIOT Act 
Beginning in 2003, numerous amendments to the USA PATRIOT Act have been 
introduced in Congress with the intention of restricting the government’s powers, 
particularly those granted in Section 215 (Klinefelter 221). Examples of this legislation 
include the Freedom to Read Act (H.R. 1157), which would have restricted the 
government’s ability to procure FISA orders to obtain library or bookseller records; the 
Library and Bookseller Protection Act (S. 1158), which would have exempted libraries 
and bookstores from Section 215 orders; and the Security and Freedom Ensured (SAFE) 
Act (H.R. 3352; S. 1709), which would require individualized suspicion for searches of 
libraries and bookstores and would remove the ability to procure FISA orders to enact 
such searches. None of these bills were ultimately passed, but portions of them were 
included in the USA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2005, 
which was passed in the House of Representatives (H.R. 3199) and Senate (S. 1389) in 
July of 2005. Congress chose to finally act to reform the PATRIOT Act this year, as 
certain sections are due to expire on December 31, 2005, including Section 215. 
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 A conference committee comprised of members of both houses began meeting on 
November 10, 2005, to reconcile the House and Senate bills. The Washington Post 
reported that congressional staff had worked out a tentative deal that the legislation 
would adhere closely to Senate bill S. 1389, which was passed the Senate on July 13, 
2005 (Eggen A03). The agreement is a result of two months of work done by senior 
House and Senate aides, but the bill must still be approved by a panel of lawmakers from 
both houses and then by the full House and Senate (Kellman). The current status of the 
USA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2005 is an Engrossed 
Amendment as Agreed to by Senate, meaning that it is the final copy of the House bill 
that has been certified by the Secretary of the Senate and includes the amendments to the 
text from floor action. It is the most recent version of the bill available. That amendment 
includes many of the safeguards that had been sought by library and civil liberties 
activists. It reauthorizes Section 215, which were due to expire at the end of 2005, until 
2009 (H.R. 3199 EAS, Sec. 9(a)).  
The amended Act also requires government agents to provide a “statement of 
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the records or other things 
sought” are “relevant to” a counter-terrorism or counter-espionage investigation and that 
items “pertain to” a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or a person in contact 
with a suspected agent (H.R. 3199 EAS, Sec. 7(a)(2)). There is also a requirement that 
records or other things to be described with “sufficient particularity” to allow them to be 
identified, which reduces the danger that that the FBI will engage in “fishing expeditions” 
in library or bookstore records (H.R. 3199 EAS, Sec. 7(b)(1)(A)). The amendment also 
provides: 
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No application shall be made under this section for an order requiring the 
production of library circulation records, library patron lists, book sales records, 
book customer lists, firearms sales records, or medical records containing 
personally identifiable information without the prior written approval of the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Director may delegate 
authority to approve such an application to the Deputy Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, but such authority may not be further delegated (H.R. 
3199 EAS, Sec. 7(c)(3)). 
 
This is one of two new sections of the Act that specifically mention library records. 
The amended Act also allows greater opportunity for the recipient of a Section 
215 request to challenge the order. First, it loosens the gag rule to allow the recipient to 
disclose that she has received an order to “those persons to whom such disclosure is 
necessary to comply with such order;” an attorney; or “other persons as permitted by the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the Director” (H.R. 
3199 EAS Sec. 7(d)(1)). It also grants the recipient of the order the right to challenge 
both the order itself as well as the gag order in the FISA Court (H.R. 3199 EAS Sec. 
7(e)). 
The amendment also improves the reporting by requiring that the DOJ report 
annually on the total number of applications made for Section 215 orders approving 
requests for the production of tangible things, and the total number of orders either 
granted, modified, or denied, when the application or order involved the production of 
tangible things from a library or the production of tangible things from a person or entity 
primarily engaged in the sale, rental, or delivery of books, journals, magazines, or other 
similar forms of communication whether in print or digitally, as well as records related to 
the purchase of a firearm, health information, or taxpayer return information (H.R. 3199 
EAS Sec. 7(f)(3)). According to a Republican aide, the tentative deal also includes a 
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provision that “the FBI would be required to destroy or return records obtained with 
secret intelligence warrants if the subjects turn out not to be connected to terrorism or 
some other crime” (Effen A03). 
Under section 505 as amended by the House bill, judges would be given the 
authority to reject NSLs: “The court may modify or set aside the request if compliance 
would be unreasonable or oppressive or would violate any constitutional or other legal 
right or privilege of the petitioner” (H.R. 3199 EAS, Sec. 8). It also allows a challenge to 
the gag order in a U.S. District Court. The court can set it aside unless doing so would 
harm national security, interfere with an investigation, interfere with diplomatic relations, 
or endanger life or physical safety (H.R. 3199 EAS, Sec. 8(b)). If the government 
certifies this would result, certification must be treated as “conclusive” (H.R. 3199 EAS, 
Sec. 8(b)). The amendment also allows the government to go to a U.S. District Court to 
seek enforcement of the NSL (H.R. 3199 EAS, Sec. 8(c)).  
VI. Establishing Constitutional Protection for Library Records 
Although the proposed changes to the PATRIOT Act put in place many 
protections for the confidentiality of library records, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to 
explicitly recognize an individual’s right to use libraries anonymously. A plaintiff 
challenging the constitutionality of any law that impinged on such a right would have 
viable claims under the penumbra of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth amendments. 
As with most constitutional law issues, the outcome would rely in large part on what 
standard of review the Court chose to apply. Since the confidentiality of library records 
implicates the First Amendment rights to anonymity and association, the standard of 
review applied in such a case should be strict scrutiny, as it was applied by the Colorado 
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Supreme Court in Kramerbooks (267 Med. L. Reptr. 1599 (D.D.C. 1998)) and in 
NAACP by the U.S. Supreme Court (357 U.S. 449 (1958)). Using strict scrutiny, the 
Court would need to weigh the stated governmental interest against the importance of 
reader privacy for the unrestrained exercise of First Amendment rights.  
A hypothetical law that would affect the confidentiality of library records would 
most likely involve either a criminal or counter-terrorism or counter-espionage 
investigation. In either context, the government interest served would be unquestionably 
compelling. The Court’s opinion would then turn on whether the challenged measure was 
narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate state interest. The government would face a 
difficult hurdle in showing that an individual’s reading records were vital to proving that 
crime or terrorist act had been committed or planned. For example, evidence that a 
suspect possessed a book about airplanes is of limited probative value in proving that that 
person was planning to hijack an airplane and fly it into a building. While the value of 
one’s library records to the government is minor, the potential harm to the individual’s 
First Amendment rights is considerable. 
When applied to the confidentiality of library records, any law that even appears 
to impinge on the right to read anonymously may deter individuals from checking out 
controversial material for fear that they will be subject to a federal investigation. The 
First Amendment is implicated because of “the societal loss which results when the 
exercise of the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment is inhibited” (Horn 749-
750). In describing the “chilling effect” that is likely to result from the PATRIOT Act 
provisions affecting the privacy of library users, ACLU staff attorney Jameel Jaffer 
stated: “If the government monitors the Web sites that people visit and the books that 
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they read, people will stop visiting disfavored Web sites and stop reading disfavored 
books” (Gellman A1). 
A challenge seeking to invalidate a law because it violates the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment right to information privacy would focus on the likelihood that 
the government would disclose the information it gathered from library patron records. If 
the Court found that the security provisions in place were not sufficient to prevent the 
public disclosure of confidential information, it would then turn to a balancing test 
similar to the one used in the First Amendment analysis. Courts have not settled on the 
appropriate standard of review for analyzing a governmental infringement of the 
information privacy interest under Whalen, but most courts have followed the approach 
in Nixon, calling it intermediate scrutiny or a balancing standard. But, some courts have 
been more rigorous and applied strict scrutiny to require the government to show a 
compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored to achieve that end (O’Donnell 63). 
Turning to the Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court would need to balance the 
individual privacy of the library patron against the potential gain to the community 
resulting from the search. The government could analogize to White that since a library 
patron voluntarily provides information to a third party, e.g. the library, she no has no 
reasonable expectation that that information will be kept private. However, unlike in 
White, the exchange of information itself is confidential and not observable by other 
parties. Furthermore, every state in the union has officially declared protection for the 
confidentiality of library records (Klinefelter 224), and privacy and confidentiality are 
well-established principles of professional ethics among librarians. Article III of the 
American Library Association’s Code of Ethics provides: “We protect each library user’s 
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right to privacy and confidentiality with respect to information sought or received and 
resources consulted, borrowed, acquired or transmitted” (“Code of Ethics”). Such 
evidence would support an argument that a library patron does have a reasonable 
expectation that any information she exposes to the library will be kept private. 
Although the amendments to the PATRIOT Act currently being considered by 
Congress will likely include safeguards for the protection of the confidentiality of library 
records, library records will continue to be vulnerable to government overreaching. The 
federal government has a well-documented history of wanting to search library records 
from the Library Awareness Program during the Cold War to not including library 
records in the Video Privacy Protection Act to, most recently, Section 215 of the 
PATRIOT Act. For this reason, it is doubtful that Congress will ever pass a statute 
protecting the confidentiality of library records. The best hope of library and civil 
liberties advocates is that the U.S. Supreme Court will finally explicitly protect the right 
to read and use libraries anonymously. It is time for the Court to recognize the 
importance of libraries to the free expression of ideas. 
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